NOTES

III

The main divisions of the magazine will constitute a carefully considered
adaptation of the arrangements generally prevailing in law reviews. The leading
articles will be by outstanding members of law school faculties and of the bench
and bar. The range of topics discussed will, it is hoped, be broad. They will always be of general interest; many of them will also be of particular local interest.
The prominence given to the department of Legislation and Administration
is but a proper recognition of the growing importance of these divisions of our
legal systems. This department will treat in these fields both general problems
and specific measures, actual and proposed.
The Comment department will be a medium for the publication of a wide
variety of shorter articles by teachers, members of the bar, and students, in
recognition of a need for which little provision has hitherto been made.
The sections devoted to case discussions will deal in varying fashions with the
more important current decisions as they appear. This detailed analysis of particular recent cases with a careful consideration of the relation between the individual case and the body of related decisions will, it is believed, prove to be
for the practicing lawyer one of the most valuable parts of the Review.
The Book Review department will provide impartial, adequate reviews of
the more important legal publications as they appear.
The Review is primarily and essentially a product of the student body. It,
of course, has and will continue to have the whole-hearted endorsement and
assistance of the Faculty, but the responsibility of the Review and the credit for
it will belong to the students of the Law School.
After a careful consideration of all the factors involved, it has been decided to
begin publication of the magazine on a quarterly basis. The value of a professional publication of any sort is not in its quantity but in its quality. The issuance of the magazine on a quarterly basis will permit a careful editing of material and a thoroughness in preparation and in details of publication that will enable the Review to make definite contributions in the field of legal literature.
HARRY A. BIGELOW, Dean
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL

POWER OF FEDERAL APPELLATE COURT TO REVIEW
RULING ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
In the latest case, dealing with the power of a Federal Appellate court to review the action of the trial court in overruling a motion for a new trial, the Supreme Court was apparently unable to escape the "dead hand" of the common
law, though the rule invoked may work grave injustices under our judicial organization for which it was never designed.
IFairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 53 Sup. Ct. 252 (i933).
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The facts involved were these:
The plaintiff brought a suit in the United States District Court for the breach
of a contract to buy a large amount of coal. The jury returned a verdict in favor
of the plaintiff for one dollar damages. The trial court overruled plaintiff's motion for a new trial and entered judgment on the verdict. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals found that under the most favorable view of the evidence
for the defendant the plaintiff was entitled to recover at least $18,250, if it was
entitled to recover at all. It treated the verdict for the plaintiff as settling its
right to recover and remanded the case for a trial of the amount of damages
only. On certiorari the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Cardozo dissenting, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals on the ground
that the ruling of the trial court in refusing to set aside the verdict was not reviewable.
There is nothing new in the general rule that the refusal of a new trial by a
federal court is not ordinarily the subject of exception and appellate review.
From a very early period the English courts, sitting in banc, exercised the power
to grant new trials for misconduct of the jury.2
As long as the doctrine prevailed that a jury might properly decide on their
own knowledge, it was impossible to obtain a new trial because a verdict was
against the evidence or not supported by the evidence.3
For a false verdict the writ of attaint was the exclusive remedy.4
In x655 a new trial was granted for excessive damages on the assumption that
the jury must have been prejudiced.5
In 1683 a new trial was apparently granted because the jury found "con'6
trary to the direction of the court."
By the middle of the seventeen hundreds the power of the court in banc to
grant new trials for all sorts of errors and mistakes on the part of the jury was
firmly established7
2 Anon. 14 H. VII, i (3) (r499) (motion for a venire de novo sustained because the jury ate
and drank during their deliberations).
Metcalf v. Dean, Cro. Eliz. i89 (i5go) (venire de novo awarded because the jury examined
a witness privately).
Apparently at this time the distinction taken in Witham v. Lewis, i Wilson 48 (1744), that
an application for a venire de novo was based on error on the face of the record and a motion
for a new trial on extrinsic matters, had not been recognized.
3Slade's Case, Style, 138 (1648).
4 Slade's Case, supra; Bushell's Case, Vaughan, 135 (1670).
s Wood v. Gunston, Style, 466 (I655). This appears to be the earliest reported case of a
new trial without some specific act of misconduct on the part of the jury. The statement in the
opinion that "It is frequent in our books for the court to take notice of miscarriagesof juries,
and to grant new trials upon them" probably refers to the misconduct cases.

6 Kaines

v. Knightly, Skinner, 54 (i683).

7 Woodford v. Eades, i Strange 425 (1721); Berks v. Mason, Sayer, 456 (756); Bright v.
Eynon, i Burr. 39o (1757); in this latter case, Lord Mansfield observed: "Trials by jury, in
civil cases, could not now subsist without a power somewhere to grant new trials."

NOTES
From a very early period new trials were granted for errors$ of law on the
part of the trial judge, but there was no occasion for appellate review of a refusal of a new trial on such grounds, because the party always had an adequate
remedy by exception to the original ruling at the trial.
Obviously a motion for a new trial was the exclusive method of calling attention to misconduct or mistake on the part of the jury, since rulings by the judge
were the only subjects of exception. But under the English practice there was
little, if any, need for appellate review of the refusal of a new trial on these
grounds, because the application was heard by a bench of four judges who were
quite as competent to handle the matter as any reviewing court. In fact a very
small percentage of the English cases ever were carried to an appellate court at
all. This seems to indicate that the work of the court in banc was in the main
satisfactory9 to the legal profession and their clients.
When the Judiciary Act of 1789 was adopted by Congress there were no English precedents for appellate review of an order refusing a new trial, and it was
accordingly held that such orders were not reviewable, for which holding a long
line of cases is cited in an exhaustive note to the opinion. It should be noted that
the Congressional scheme for something in the nature of a court in banc soon
failed in practice, with the result that in the federal courts, as in nearly all of
the state courts, a motion for a new trial is passed on by a single judge, and
hence the litigant has no remedy for his errors in this particular unless the Circuit Court of Appeals has some power of review.
Doubtless, legislation would be necessary to give the Circuit Court of Appeals
the same power of appellate review that is today exercised by most of the state
appellate courts.
Under the implied adoption of the common law by the Judiciary Act, where
the question is one of fact, such as the ordinary question of excessive or inadequate damages, depending on different views of the evidence, the decision of the
trial judge doubtless is conclusive.
But the Supreme Court has recognized that the trial judge does not have an
absolutely free hand in dealing with a motion for a new trial. He may not exclude competent evidence bearing on a question raised by the motion, and his
action in this regard is reviewable.- When a state supreme court, dealing with
a case under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, found that a verdict was excessive because of prejudice on the part of the jury, but allowed a remittitur instead of a new trial, the Supreme Court found no difficulty in reviewing this ac8 Reg. v. Corporation of Helston, io Mod. 202 (1714), and innumerable later cases where
new trials were granted for misdirection, errors in rulings on evidence, etc.
9 At a much later date the common law Procedure Act (854) provided for appellate review
of rulings on motions for new trials not involving matters of discretion. Under the Judicature
Act and the present rules of court the English Court of Appeals seems to have the powers of a
trial court in dealing with new trials, and its decisions are reviewable by the House of Lords.
Jones v. Spencer, 77 L.T.R. 536 (i898).
-oMattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892).
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tion, and reversing it as an error of law.- It may be taken, then, that the district court may commit errors of law in refusing a new trial, and of necessity the
Court of Appeals must have the power to determine whether such an error has
been committed. It was urged in this case that it was such an error to refuse to
set aside a verdict for nominal damages where the evidence conclusively established substantial damages, but the majority opinion takes the position that the
trial judge was not bound to treat the verdict for nominal damages as settling
the right to recover, because the jury may have returned that verdict in order to
saddle the costs on the defendant, without really finding the issues for the plaintiff. It is, of course, possible that the jury may have indulged in that misconduct, but it is a startling doctrine that the discretion of the single judge authorizes him to bind a party on the basis of a mere speculative possibility. Besides,
there is nothing to indicate that the trial judge acted on such a theory.
There is a well known doctrine, applied in a number of tort cases cited in the
opinion, that a court may properly refuse to grant the plaintiff a new trial for
inadequate damages where under the evidence it was fairly clear that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover at all. 2 The case at bar apparently does not present that situation.
The opinion states:
"The plaintiffs were not entitled to a directed verdict; the evidence was voluminous; and on some issues at least conflicting. The instructions left the contested issues of liability to the jury. The verdict may have represented a finding
for the defendant on those issues."
It is to be regretted that the majority opinion should strain the doctrine of
discretion to limit the power of appellate review, when the absence of a court in
banc has deprived the litigant of an important common law safeguard.
E. W. IIMTON*
1M.

& St. P. Ry. Co. v. Moquin, 283 U.S. 520 (1930). In a note appended to the opinion in

the principal case the following reference to the Moquin case appears: "Compare Minneapolis,
St. P. &S. S. M. Ry. Co. v. Moquin, 283 U.S. 520, 51 Sup. Ct. 5o, 75 L. Ed. 1243, in which the
trialcourt, expressing the opinion that the verdict was excessive because of passion and prejudice, nevertheless refused, on the filing of a remittitur, to grant a new trial." This appears to
be a mistake. An examination of the printed record in the Moquin case fails to disclose any
such opinion by the trial court. So far as the record shows, the defendant's original motion for
judgment or for a new trial was overruled without an opinion. On appeal from this order the
Supreme Court of Minnesota found that the verdict was excessive because of passion, etc.,
but
affirmed on condition of a remittitur by the plaintiff. When the case was remanded to the trial
court, plaintiff filed a consent to a remittitur, and judgment was entered in accordance with the
viandate for the reduced amount.
12Johnson v. Franklin, 112 Conn. 228, 152 Atl. 64 (1930).
* James Parker Hall Professor of Law, the University of Chicago Law School.

